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Liability of Auditors*
By Sir Nicholas Waterhouse
All of you are no doubt familiar with those fascinating mystery 
stories at the end of which the brilliant amateur detective con­
founds the painstaking inspector by pointing to the perpetrator of 
the crime and at the same time to some small step which the in­
spector might have taken and thereby have placed himself on the 
sure road to discovery. When this denouement occurs it counts 
for nothing that the inspector has taken all those steps which ex­
perience has shown to be most likely to result in detection of such 
a crime as has been committed, nor is it deemed relevant that to 
have taken all the unlikely steps, one of which, as it turns out, 
would have resulted in discovery, would have necessitated the 
employment of men and time to an extent far beyond his re­
sources. He is left to bear with what equanimity he can com­
mand the tolerant superiority of the amateur and the more open 
scorn of the minor characters in the story.
The feelings aroused in readers of such tales vary—some are 
lost in admiration of the achievements of the brilliant amateur; 
others feel a certain sympathy with the criminal whose well-laid 
plans have been frustrated by the combination of a seemingly in­
consequential error and the uncanny intuition of his nemesis; few 
waste any sympathy upon the discomfited inspector. But among 
those few (if it be true that a fellow feeling makes us wondrous 
kind) should be found those readers who happen to be profes­
sional auditors of accounts. For if they have been so fortunate 
as to enjoy a considerable practice, they are almost certain to be 
reminded of occasions on which they have vainly attempted to 
explain the fact that a defalcation undiscovered by them has been 
perpetrated in connection with accounts which have been sub­
jected to their audit. At such a time the sufferer from the defal­
cation is apt to be unable to see anything except the one fact that 
an apparently simple step, involving perhaps no great amount of 
work, would have led to the detection of the fraud. Patiently, 
but with small hope of success, the auditor explains that the steps 
which he did take would in ninety-nine out of a hundred cases be
* An address delivered to the London members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales, January 18, 1934.
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more likely to prove effective, and that if he had done all the many 
things that might possibly have unearthed the defalcation, the 
scope and extent of the audit would have been extended beyond 
all reason. Delicately he points out things which the client him­
self or his staff might have done which would have made such a 
defalcation impossible or resulted in its discovery.
The analogy is not perfect. In the mystery story it is not sug­
gested that the unsuccessful inspector should be cast in pecuniary 
damages for his failure or even that he should lose his position. 
The auditor is lucky if he is not confronted with both these 
suggestions.
In justice to one’s clients let me say that many of them, when 
satisfied that the auditor has served them loyally and carried out 
his duties conscientiously, are willing to take a reasonable view of 
such a case. There are, however, exceptions, particularly in those 
cases where to absolve the auditor from blame is to imply that the 
directors themselves were negligent, or where the fraudulent em­
ployee has been the subject of a fidelity bond and the insurer 
refuses to accept liability until it has been proved that the auditor 
has not been negligent. The professional auditor is then at a dis­
tinct disadvantage and the case is made more delicate and difficult 
for him by the fact that his principal asset is his reputation and 
that resistance to the claim may result in damage to that reputa­
tion, whether or not it results in a pecuniary liability.
Now, the lawyers may tell us that this is wholly a matter of con­
tract, express or implied, and that it is for the accountant to see 
that the respective rights and obligations of his clients, the in­
surers and himself are defined to his satisfaction. I think that in 
cases in which the auditor is retained expressly to make an inter­
nal audit it is possible at the time of making the contract to define 
his position in the unfortunate event of a defalcation taking place 
and escaping detection by him. And, in passing, may I say that 
he should not accept a contractual relationship under which he 
may be held pecuniarily liable if he fails to live up to the standards 
of effectiveness set by the heroes of detective fiction.
For the present, however, I should like to direct your attention 
to the narrower question which is presented when the auditor is 
appointed under the companies acts and assumes purely statutory 
obligations. Since the question has not been settled by legal 
decisions, and since I am not a lawyer, I am not going to under­
take to define the legal position. I am going to put before you
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only the view suggested by my knowledge, inherited or acquired, 
of the history of the law, and by my experience in the field of 
business as well as in that of auditing.
The protection of a company against risks of fraud by its em­
ployees, the detection of frauds which occur and the recovery of 
whatever reparation can be obtained, are obviously purely ad­
ministrative functions. The problem of safeguarding transac­
tions is always a matter of weighing the risks of loss against the 
costs of protection and, therefore, a matter lying wholly in the 
field of business judgment. The detection of frauds is usually 
most likely to be accomplished by continuous supervision which, 
unless the volume of business is small, can best be given by per­
sons regularly employed for that purpose. Indeed, modern 
developments, and particularly the increased use of mechanical 
devices, while resulting in greater economy, accuracy and expedi­
tion in the field of bookkeeping, have undoubtedly made the 
detailed audit which is not continuous and practically contem­
poraneous with the transactions audited extremely difficult and 
expensive.
It can not, therefore, be questioned that apart from the statute 
the work of detecting fraud falls on the directors and on those 
whom they employ. Nor is there, I think, the slightest ground 
for a suggestion that the audit provisions of the companies acts 
have in any degree changed this position.
The provisions of the companies acts relating to the duties of 
auditors are of course familiar to you, but it may be desirable here 
to recall the precise language in which they are expressed in 
section 134 (1) of the act of 1929, as follows:
“The auditors shall make a report to the members on the ac­
counts examined by them, and on every balance-sheet laid before 
the company in general meeting during their tenure of office and 
the report shall state—
“ (a) Whether or not they have obtained all the information 
and explanations they have required, and
“ (b) Whether in their opinion the balance-sheet referred to in 
the report is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true 
and correct view of the state of the company’s affairs 
according to the best of their information and the ex­
planations given to them and as shown by the books of 
the company.”
The sole objective of the auditor’s work which is indicated is the 
formulation by the auditor of an informed opinion on the question
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whether the balance-sheet of the company exhibits a true and cor­
rect view of the state of the company’s affairs. This is a far less 
onerous task than for the auditors to satisfy themselves as far as 
possible (the limitation is inescapable) whether all the transac­
tions of the company have been faithfully recorded and all funds 
honestly administered.
Attempts are sometimes made to impose the more onerous 
responsibility on the auditor by inference. The auditor must see 
that the balance-sheet is exactly correct (so runs the argument) 
and it can not be correct unless all the transactions are correctly 
reflected therein: therefore the auditor must do everything in his 
power to satisfy himself that all the transactions are honestly and 
properly recorded. This argument not only overstates in its 
premise the express requirements of the act, but in its conclu­
sion violates the principles which govern the construction of 
statutes.
If parliament had intended to impose the more onerous duty on 
auditors, it would have done so in express terms: it would not have 
defined the minor obligation and left the major obligation a mat­
ter of inference. The contrast in this respect between the general 
companies acts and acts such as the building societies act of 1874 
or the friendly societies act, 1896, is striking and significant. 
Section 27 of the latter act reads in part as follows:
“Sec. 27. Every registered society and branch shall once in 
every year . . . send to the registrar a return ... of the 
receipts and expenditure, funds and effects of the society or 
branch as audited.”
“Sec. 26. The auditors shall have access to all the books and 
accounts of the society or branch, and shall examine the an­
nual return mentioned in this act, and verify the annual 
return with the accounts and vouchers relating thereto, and 
shall either sign the annual return as found by them to be 
correct, duly vouched and in accordance with law, or 
specially report to the society or branch in what respects 
they find it incorrect, unvouched or not in accordance with 
law.”
It would have been easy to embody similar language in the gen­
eral company law, but this has never been done, no doubt for the 
simple reason that it was not necessary to the accomplishment of 
the purpose which parliament had in contemplation; viz., a rea­
sonable measure of protection for members against deception or 
other wrongful acts on the part of directors and officers. It was
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no part of this purpose to assign to the members and the auditor 
appointed by them duties which properly belong to the directors.
The origin and development of the audit imposed by section 
134 (1) of the act of 1929, which perhaps for the sake of brevity I 
may allude to hereafter as the “official” audit, is fairly sum­
marized in Spicer & Pegler’s Practical Auditing, 3rd edition, page 
13, as follows:
“The fact that the whole control of the company was vested in 
the directors rendered it necessary that some means should be 
utilized of enabling the shareholders to be assured that the ac­
counts presented to them by the board correctly represented the 
state of affairs of the company and that the directors had not 
utilized their position for the purpose of misappropriating the 
funds of the company or using them for their private gains. It 
was impracticable however for every individual shareholder to 
satisfy himself on these points, for as a rule he was not possessed 
of the requisite technical knowledge and the right of inspection 
and enquiry could not be given to one shareholder without it being 
granted to all. Consequently, it became usual for shareholders 
to appoint one or more of their number to act as auditor or audi­
tors of the company and to report to the shareholders on their 
examination of the balance-sheet and accounts. Subsequently it 
was found inadvisable to confine this function to individual 
shareholders who might not be possessed of the requisite quali­
fications, and it became usual to appoint professional auditors to 
act on behalf of the shareholders generally.”
In discussions of this subject a statement by the late Professor 
Dicksee is sometimes quoted to the effect that the object or scope 
of an audit may be defined as threefold: (1) detection of fraud; 
(2) detection of technical errors; (3) detection of errors of 
principle.
This language, however, occurs in the course of a discussion on 
auditing in its broadest sense, and when an accountant is specifi­
cally employed to make a complete internal audit it is, I think, 
applicable. It is, however, I suggest, wholly inappropriate in 
relation to audits under the companies acts. Indeed, Professor 
Dicksee goes on to say quite correctly: “The extent of an audi­
tor’s duties depends entirely upon the express or implied contract 
between himself and his client.”
I suggest that the scope of the official audit is rather:
1. To ascertain whether any balance-sheets or other accounts 
submitted to members are in accord with the books of ac­
counts from which they would ordinarily be made up.
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2. To reach by examination and enquiry a reasonably in­
formed opinion on the question whether the books are so 
kept that a true and correct view of the state of the com­
pany’s affairs can be obtained therefrom.
3. To determine whether the directors and officers of the com­
pany in preparing from the books the balance-sheets or 
other accounts and submitting them to members have 
dealt fairly and honestly with the members.
The duties imposed on the auditors by section 134 (1) in respect 
of accounts other than balance-sheets are quite indefinite. The 
auditors are not expressly required to examine any other ac­
counts. If they do so they must report on them, but the nature 
of the report to be made is not indicated as it is in the case of the 
balance-sheet. Where, however, accounts are so closely related 
to the balance-sheet as to constitute a part of the information 
given to members in relation to the state of the company’s affairs, 
the auditor will be wise to regard them for this purpose as a part 
of the balance-sheet.
The auditor must not form his opinion lightly, but he is not re­
quired to know everything that there is to be known about a 
company before he does so.
The duty imposed on the auditor has remained substantially 
unchanged from the enactment of the companies act of 1862 
(table A) to the present time: there is nothing to indicate that in 
the intervening seventy years the conception of the role of the 
members’ auditor has been materially changed. It may be noted, 
however, that changes such as the substitution of the word 
“report” for the word “certify” do not suggest any enlargement 
of the auditor’s obligation.
No one would propose that in the case of large undertakings the 
auditors, as an incident to the determination of the state of the 
company’s affairs, should undertake to duplicate the work done 
by the internal auditing department of the company. The law 
makes no distinction between large and small companies and the 
only interpretation of the act capable of general application is that 
it leaves the responsibility for the internal audit to the directors 
and their appointees.
It is quite true that in the case of small companies the mainte­
nance of an elaborate organization such as would afford adequate 
internal checks might involve undue expense, and it is doubtless 
generally true that in such cases economy and efficiency can best
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be combined by arranging for continuous or frequent checks of 
the accounts by professional accountants. Moreover, the most 
convenient and economical course for the directors to adopt will 
usually be to retain for such a purpose the professional account­
ants who act as statutory auditors of the company. But I sub­
mit that there is a clear distinction between the work done by the 
accountants upon the instructions of the directors, practically as a 
part of the internal machinery of the company, and the work which 
falls to them as statutory auditors. If in such a case a defalca­
tion occurs and escapes detection, questions may arise concern­
ing the liability of the auditors. The first will be whether there is 
any liability in respect of their position as statutory auditors or 
whether the liability arises from their employment by the directors.
In my view the question of defalcations arises in connection 
with the official audit only incidentally in cases where one effect of 
the defalcation is that the balance-sheet (or an account so related 
thereto as to come within the scope of the auditors’ report) is in­
correct to a material extent, as, for instance, where debts carried 
as assets have in fact been collected and the proceeds appropriated 
by the defaulter.
In considering the position of a statutory auditor in relation to 
a defalcation, the vital question would seem to be whether a rea­
sonable enquiry into the state of the company’s affairs would 
have disclosed the over-statement and consequently the defalca­
tion. If so, the auditor will no doubt be liable for the conse­
quence of his failure to detect the over-statement of assets, but 
the question will still remain how far the fact that if he had done 
so further defalcations might have been prevented can properly 
be taken into account in assessing damages against him.
It is difficult to see how any claim could be asserted where the 
defalcations have been covered up in charges to expenses ac­
counts so that the assets are not overstated and where the profit- 
and-loss account shows a single figure of profit “after deduction of 
all losses and expenses.”
The extent of the auditors’ liability arising out of employment 
by the directors will turn on the nature of their contract.
A number of cases in which claims against auditors for non­
discovery of defalcations were based on their contract of employ­
ment have been before the courts, but I know of no case in which 
such a liability has been asserted against an auditor in respect of 
his purely statutory duties under the companies act.
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We are all familiar with the language in the decisions in the 
London and General Bank case and the Kingston Cotton Mills case. 
In those cases the auditors had been misled into making reports in 
which, as subsequently appeared, the assets were grossly over­
stated—a matter upon which they were required by the express 
terms of the act to report. When it is recalled that even upon 
this issue the court used such language as:
“He is justified in believing tried servants of the company in 
whom confidence is placed by the company”;
“He is entitled to assume that they are honest and to rely upon 
their representations provided he takes reasonable care”;
“Auditors must not be made liable for not tracking down in­
genious and carefully laid schemes of fraud when there is nothing 
to arouse their suspicion and when these frauds are perpetrated 
by tried servants of the company and are undetected for years by 
the directors”;
“Where there is nothing to excite suspicion very little enquiry 
will be reasonable and sufficient and in practice I believe business 
men select a few cases haphazard, see that they are right and as­
sume that others like them are correct also”;
it would seem safe to assume that the court would not hold an 
auditor to a higher standard of responsibility in respect of duties 
which are not mentioned in the act and the assertion of which is 
an attempt greatly to extend by inference the express require­
ments of the act and to transfer to the appointees of the members, 
duties and obligations which naturally and logically attach to the 
directors and those appointed by them.
I should not like it to be thought for a moment that in my view 
a statutory auditor need feel no concern as to the degree of effi­
ciency of the protection afforded by the company’s methods 
against defalcations by employees or that he should take no 
steps to satisfy himself that the system is being carried out in 
practice. On the contrary, an auditor, even if undertaking 
nothing more than the official audit, should always examine the 
methods of control and test their working before he accepts the 
books as a basis for a balance-sheet which he proposes in his re­
port to approve as exhibiting a true and correct view of the state 
of the company’s affairs. An auditor who had signed a balance- 
sheet which had been proved to be substantially incorrect and 
sought to defend himself on the ground that the balance-sheet was 
in accordance with the information and explanations secured by 
him and was as shown by the books of the company would find his
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defence gravely compromised if it were demonstrated that the 
accounting methods and control of the company were so lax and 
inadequate that no reliance could properly be placed upon the 
books.
Not only so, but while the auditor may properly refuse to ac­
cept a pecuniary responsibility which does not justly attach to his 
work, he has (if, as is now customary, he is a professional ac­
countant) an obligation to make his work as valuable to his clients 
as possible within the limits of his appointment. His expert sur­
vey of the methods employed and the moral effect of intelligent 
tests of the working of the system, restricted though those tests 
may be, will exercise a valuable deterrent influence. I believe 
that the purpose of the modern criminal law is to act as a deter­
rent, the punishment of the individual being regarded as necessary 
to this purpose rather than retributive. No one denies, just be­
cause crimes are still committed, that the law and the police have 
such an effect nor can the deterrent effect of audits be denied 
because defalcations still occur.
The correct view of the relation of the shareholders’ audit to the 
question of defalcations by employees is, I suggest, that it has this 
by no means inconsiderable preventive value, but it involves no 
sort of guaranty nor any undertaking to be responsible for the con­
sequences if in a particular case such an audit neither prevents 
nor discloses a defalcation. It should not be relied on to disclose 
defalcations except so far as discovery would be a natural result 
of any reasonably adequate enquiry into the state of the com­
pany’s affairs. If the directors desire further protection in the 
form of supplementary service by the auditor, the extent of the 
protection and the corresponding liability become matters of 
contract.
In the United States I believe there is no official audit, but the 
question of the scope of an examination sufficient to warrant a 
report by auditors, somewhat similar to that called for by our 
statute, has received considerable attention in recent years. As 
early as 1917, the question what examination was sufficient to 
justify certificate of a balance-sheet for credit purposes was con­
sidered by the federal trade commission (a body somewhat 
analogous to the board of trade) and by the federal reserve board 
(which supervises the federal banking system) and a pamphlet 
was issued by the latter body in that year and was revised in 
1929. During the current year the New York stock exchange has
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indicated that it regards the scheme of examination outlined in 
that pamphlet as justifying certification of the balance-sheet for 
submission to shareholders. It is interesting to note that in the 
first paragraph of this pamphlet it is stated that the procedure 
outlined “will not necessarily disclose defalcation,” so that ap­
parently the view in America is that an examination which is not 
sufficiently extensive to ensure the disclosure of defalcations may 
be entirely adequate as a basis for reporting to shareholders 
whether a given balance-sheet exhibits a correct view of the finan­
cial position of the company. Anyone who has read the pam­
phlet will, I am sure, share that view.
What, then, should be the nature of the contract between the 
company and the auditor? Obviously, there must be a wide 
range in the scope of usefulness of the professional auditor in vary­
ing circumstances. The principal determining factors are, per­
haps, the size and number of individual transactions and the 
extent of the internal audit. A company with a small staff enter­
ing into a relatively small number of important transactions may 
prudently instruct the auditor to make the most complete veri­
fication possible. Conversely, a company with a large staff, 
entering into a larger number of relatively small transactions, 
should rely mainly on a proper subdivision of work and internal 
audit and ask the auditor to do no more than to satisfy himself 
thoroughly of the theoretical effectiveness of the internal system 
and make such tests of its practical working as will convince him 
that it is being made effective in practice. Between these limits 
varying degrees of completeness in the work of the auditor may be 
appropriate.
Naturally the fee and the degree of responsibility assumed must 
both vary as the audit is more or less extensive. And on this 
point I should like to say a word of caution to the practising ac­
countant and especially to those beginning practice.
We sometimes hear complaints that after a defalcation has been 
discovered clients take a view of the extent of the work which the 
auditor should have performed which is far more comprehensive 
than that which they took when instructing him and arranging 
the fee. The auditor should avoid the corresponding unfairness 
of leading his client to expect a greater degree of protection than 
the procedure he proposes to adopt will in reality afford. Today, 
the value of the work of auditors is too highly appreciated for it to 
be excusable for the auditor to emulate the share-pusher and at-
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tribute to his work a value greater than it can be expected to 
possess.
However extensive his work, an auditor should not be expected 
to agree to assume a pecuniary responsibility for losses which 
might have been avoided had he discovered a defalcation which 
for a time escapes detection, without regard to the amount of the 
loss or to the ingenuity of the methods employed by the defaulter 
or to the fact that the directors or employees of the company may 
by their acts or negligence have contributed to the successful 
concealment of the irregularities.
This is essentially a risk to be covered by an insurance, the 
amount of which is predetermined and the cost or premium com­
mensurate with that amount. The audit should greatly reduce 
the risk and therefore the necessary premium, but it should not 
be regarded as in the nature of insurance or reinsurance.
It is an entirely mistaken notion, which is, however, held by 
some people, that an auditor is legally liable for the amount of any 
defalcation which occurs after the date of an audit at which he 
might have discovered that one was being perpetrated, without 
regard to the difficulties of detection or to the extent to which the 
directors may have contributed to the loss by their acts or negli­
gence. No cases involving this question have, I believe, reached 
the higher courts, but in the London Oil Storage Company case 
(1904) it was considered very carefully. That case was tried by 
Lord Alverstone, and Mr. Rufus Isaacs (now Lord Reading) was 
counsel for the auditor. The neglect complained of was failure 
at any time to verify a petty-cash balance which over a period of 
years had increased from about £100 to nearly £800. It was 
thus a step which might be regarded as incidental to a determina­
tion of the state of the company’s affairs. The auditor was ap­
pointed under the articles of association, which were rather more 
stringent than the provisions of the present statute. In his 
charge to the jury, the lord chief justice said:
“The conduct of the directors is no answer to any breach of 
duty by the defendant, but it is a circumstance you must take 
into consideration, because if you are of opinion that the loss was 
occasioned by a man stealing the money in consequence of there 
being a want of proper control over him, then the fact of there 
being a breach of duty by the auditor is what we lawyers call a 
4 causa Causans ’ which contributed to but would not be the cause 
of the loss. I do not know that I ever remember a question the 
solution of which was more difficult in the concrete. It is easy to
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put it in general terms: Was he guilty of breach of duty, and if so, 
what loss was occasioned to this company by that breach of duty? 
You must not put upon him the loss by reason of theft occurring 
afterwards or before, but you must put upon him such damages as 
you consider in your opinion were really caused by his not having 
fulfilled his duty as auditor of the company.”
The jury found that there was a breach of duty extending over 
four years, but they assessed the damages at only five guineas, add­
ing that they considered the directors to have been guilty of gross 
negligence. In the course of the subsequent discussion of the 
judgment to be entered, the lord chief justice said:
“It was not a case in which Mr. Hasluck had said (as he might 
have said quite honorably, I think): ‘My clerk was careless but 
the directors so acted that it caused the company no damage.’ If 
that had been the way the case had been fought, I think Mr. 
Isaacs’ contention would have been unanswerable, and that the 
action ought not to have been brought.”
In one of the decisions of our court of appeal which I have 
already quoted the following sentence occurs:
“If there is anything calculated to arouse suspicion he should 
probe it to the bottom, but in the absence of anything of that kind 
he is only bound to be reasonably cautious and careful.”
I have been surprised to find this language interpreted as 
meaning that when once an auditor’s suspicions are aroused he 
must as a part of his statutory duty and without special compen­
sation continue his investigations until he has found the truth, 
however deeply it may be buried.
I do not think that many clients would take such a view. Most 
of them would, I feel sure, be appreciative of the vigilance of the 
auditor which had resulted in discovering the defalcation and be 
content themselves to bear the expense of investigating its extent 
and its effect on the state of the company’s affairs. In any case 
it is satisfactory to find that Lord Alverstone lent no support to the 
exaggerated view of the auditor’s duty, for, after quoting the 
language above cited, he said:
“And apart from the circumstances of this case, I think Mr. 
Hasluck made an answer which shows that he appreciated his 
duty when he said, ‘Had I any reason to think that the amount of 
cash retained at the city office was too much, I should have gone 
to the directors and asked for an explanation: that would have 
been my duty’; and so far as I may express an opinion, I think 
that is a true view of what his duty would have been under the
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statute and the articles. He ought if his suspicion was aroused 
by anything that was called to his attention, to have gone to the 
directors and asked for an explanation.”
Some years ago an interesting American case was reported in 
the Accountant. The auditors of a New York stockbroker’s firm 
receiving an annual fee of not more than $2,000 were sued for 
damages and at the end of the trial the judge finally left to the 
jury two questions:
(1) Were the defendants negligent in the performance of their 
agreement, and (2) If so, what damages to the plaintiffs resulted 
directly and proximately from such negligence? The first ques­
tion was answered in the affirmative, and to the second the jury 
answered "$1,177,805.26."
Afterwards, however, the court set aside the answer to the 
second question and directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in 
the amount of $2,000. Upon appeal, the appellate division of the 
state of New York, by a majority of three to one, sustained the 
decision of the lower court, and in doing so, said with regard to the 
damages of $1,177,805:
“We think the damages can not be said to flow naturally or 
directly from defendants’ negligence or breach of contract. 
Plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover for losses which they 
could have avoided by the exercise of reasonable care.”
The Court of Appeals of New York, a court which I believe 
possesses an authority in America only less than the Supreme 
Court of the United States, unanimously confirmed the decision of 
the Appellate Court.
Quite recently, the court of appeals of Manitoba gave a 
decision in an extremely interesting case (International Labora­
tories Limited v. Dewar et al). In the court of first instance the 
judge made a number of decisions adverse to the auditors which, if 
they had been sustained, would, I think, have made a complete 
reconsideration of the legal position of auditors inevitable.
The company was a subsidiary with no stockholders except the 
holding company, and the audit arrangements had been made by 
correspondence with the officers of the holding company and con­
firmed by those of the subsidiary. The auditors had undertaken 
a restricted audit, after warning their clients of the risks such 
restriction entailed. The loss was covered by insurance, and it 
was admitted that the suit was brought in the interest of insurers. 
The defalcations were ultimately discovered by the auditors, who
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were instructed by the company to investigate the records and 
determine the amount stolen.
The trial judge, that is, the judge of the court of first instance, 
dismissed the correspondence from consideration, holding that it 
was ineffectual to relieve the auditors of a duty which was imposed 
on them by the statute, the proper performance of which would, 
in his view, have resulted in the prompt discovery of the defalca­
tions in the first year in which they occurred, that the auditors 
were consequently liable for the amount of all subsequent de­
falcations and that the insurers were entitled to recover upon the 
principle of subrogation. How extreme were his views on the 
responsibility of auditors may be judged from a single sentence 
quoted from his decision:
“When the defendants assumed their duties and continued to 
carry them out from year to year, the necessity for special vigi­
lance by the plaintiff as against its employees was removed.”
Fortunately for the profession, and as I think, for the business 
world also, the appeal court disagreed with the trial judge on his 
law as well as on his interpretation of the evidence. With one 
dissentient out of five judges, that court completely reversed the 
decision of the court below and decided the issues in favor of the 
auditors, both on the claim and the counter-claim for services in 
investigating the thefts. The dissenting judge would have found 
for the plaintiff on certain items constituting about one-third of 
the total claim.
All of the judges founded their decisions on the contract created 
by the correspondence. With the exception noted, all agreed that 
there was no breach of duty under that contract. Since this 
conclusion disposed of the case, all further observations are in the 
nature of obiter dicta. Nevertheless, it seems worth while to 
quote the two following excerpts:
“The liability sought to be imposed on the defendants is, in this 
view, based on the failure of the defendants to protect the plain­
tiff from its own negligence.” (Trueman, J. A.)
“There is a certain minimum of control which every firm is 
bound to exercise over the operations in its office and which the 
auditors will properly assume to have been exercised.” (Prender­
gast, C. J.)
I do not think that the burden placed on the auditor is un­
reasonable, in theory, even under a contract express or implied 
that required from him far more than the official audit. He is
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required to display only reasonable skill and reasonable diligence : 
he is not liable merely because he fails to discover a most in­
genious fraud and if the primary cause of the loss is negligent 
administration, his liability will, in law, be relatively small. 
What, then, are the reasons that make the question of liability a 
serious one?
The first is that, as stated by Lord Alverstone in the passage 
which I have already quoted, it is easier to define the auditor’s 
liability in general terms than to deal with the question concretely. 
Consequently, the auditor is in the hands of a jury, and unless 
their decision is quite unreasonable it will not be interfered with. 
The second is that the question whether a fraud might have been 
discovered by reasonable skill and diligence is apt to take on a 
very different color when the fraud has, in fact, been discovered 
and the means by which it might have been unearthed earlier have 
become apparent. It is too much to expect of jurymen that they 
should be able to put themselves back into the position of the 
auditor before the discovery had been made. In the third place, 
the question what constitutes reasonable skill and diligence is 
always a difficult one. The courts have indicated that such a 
question can best be answered by ascertaining whether other skilled 
persons would have regarded the procedure actually followed as 
adequate or whether they would have done something more which 
would have prevented or reduced the loss. It is easy to be 
wise after the event, and an expert may be prone to think that he 
would have done what as it turns out would have been effective; 
or, on the other hand, he may find it embarrassing to say that he 
would have done something which another expert, whom he re­
gards as equally competent, did not do. Answers to hypotheti­
cal questions after the event are not a very satisfactory basis 
on which to have to depend for a decision whether a loss which 
may be disastrous is to fall upon an auditor.
Undoubtedly, however, the consideration which adds most to 
the seriousness of the question of the liability of an auditor is that 
he has much more to lose than the person asserting the claim 
against him and that claimants can not fail to be aware of this 
fact. The mere fact that a suit for negligence is brought against 
him is apt to prove injurious whatever the outcome may be; and, 
if he loses, the damages and costs may be out of all proportion to 
any compensation he has ever received. There is no doubt that 
recognition of these facts has led to claims being made and paid 
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that could scarcely have survived scrutiny in a court of law. 
It follows, I think, from the foregoing that the remedy for un­
satisfactory conditions lies not in changes of the law but mainly 
in ourselves. If we are careful what contracts, express or im­
plied, we enter into; if we do our work with reasonable compe­
tence and diligence; if we make up our minds to face the trouble 
and annoyance which resistance to unfounded claims will some­
times entail, we have little to fear.
I think, however, that the organized bodies of the profession 
should do something to place the relations between clients, 
insurers and auditors on a more satisfactory footing. In the 
Manitoba case which I have mentioned, Mr. Justice Robson said:
“Much has been said about subrogation and suggestion that 
the insurers now have a right through plaintiff against defendants. 
I fail to see anything of the sort in the relationship of the parties.”
If this is not the legal position in England steps should be taken to 
make it so, and I should suppose that this could readily be ac­
complished by appropriate wording in contracts of insurance.
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